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The Nature of the Foreign Listing Premium: 
A Cross-Country Examination 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
An expanding literature asserts that non-U.S. firms achieve a valuation premium for listing on 
U.S. equity markets. In this paper we examine the foreign listing premium across a global sample 
of exchange-listed foreign listings with particular emphasis on the top ten home markets and top 
ten host markets for foreign listings. We highlight that the documented valuation premium for 
listing on U.S. exchanges is not unique but common to many home and host markets including 
U.S. firms that list abroad. The cross-sectional variation in the valuation premium appears to 
have little association with any unique institutional features of the market; rather the premium is 
related to variation in pre-listing valuation ratios.  
 
 
JEL classification: G15; G32  
Keywords: Cross listings; Firm valuation; Rule of law; Stock exchanges; Tobin’s Q 
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1. Introduction 
A large literature documents a substantive and sustained valuation premium for non-U.S. 
firms that list their equity on U.S. exchanges over peer firms that do not.1 A prevailing 
explanation for the U.S. foreign listing premium is that investors pay more for firms that commit 
to improvements in investor protection and information dissemination by adopting the more 
stringent legal, monitoring, and accounting standards, associated with U.S. financial markets (see 
Coffee, 1999, 2002; Stulz, 1999; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004, 2009; Doidge, 2004; Reese 
and Weisbach, 2004; Benos and Weisbach, 2004; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Doidge, et al., 2009; 
Hail and Leuz, 2009).2 This explanation, known as the bonding theory, predicts that because of 
the superior institutional features of the U.S. market, listings in the United States should be 
associated with the largest valuation effects. As characterized by Licht, Li, and Siegel (2011), 
“…it is a truth universally acknowledged that a foreign firm in possession of a good fortune must 
be in want of a U.S. listing.” 
In this paper, we examine the foreign listing premium across a wide cross-section of 
home and host markets. Our sample of foreign listings consists of 2,838 listings from 69 home 
markets that list their shares on 32 foreign stock exchanges over a period of 22 years from 1985 
to 2006.3 We particularly focus on comparing the foreign listing premium of firms from the top 
ten home markets in as well as to the top ten host markets in our sample. The ten largest suppliers 
                                                            
1 See Sundaram and Logue (1996), Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004, 2009), Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003), Doidge 
(2004), King and Mittoo (2007), Doidge, et al. (2009), Litvak (2007, 2008), and Duarte, et al. (2009). 
2 Other motives for listings in the United States include better access to customers and suppliers (Saudagaran, 1988; 
Mittoo, 1992; Pagano, Roell, and Zechner; 2002), risk sharing across segmented markets (Black, 1974; Solnik, 1974; 
Stulz, 1981; Errunza and Losq, 1985; Alexander, Eun, and Janakiramanan, 1988; Foerster and Karolyi, 1998, 1999), 
committing insiders to better information disclosure (Cantale, 1996; Fuerst, 1998; Moel, 1999; Huddart, Hughes, and 
Brunnermeier, 1999; Goto, Watanabe, and Xu, 2009), promoting product visibility and reputation (Bancel and 
Mittoo, 2001; Pagano, Roell, and Zechner, 2002), improving security marketability to pools of investors (Foester and 
Karolyi, 1999; Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver, 2002; Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva, 2005, Fernandes and Ferreira, 
2008), reducing trading costs of foreign shareholders (Sarkissian and Schill, 2004), achieving better liquidity (Tinic 
and West, 1974; Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan, 1998; Werner and Kleidon, 1996; Foerster and Karolyi, 1998), 
and facilitating opportunistic financing  and cross-border acquisitions (Gangon and Karolyi, 2009). Except for the 
better access to customers and suppliers explanation, none of these motives predict a sustained value premium. 
3 We use the words “foreign listing,” “overseas listing,” “cross listing,” and “cross-border listing” interchangeably, 
although, technically speaking, a foreign listing may not necessarily constitute a cross-listing if it is traded only in 
the foreign market. 
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(home markets) of listings in our sample are Canada (483 listings), the United States (288), the 
United Kingdom (239), Australia (163), India (162), Japan (142), Israel (137), Netherlands (120), 
France (97), and Germany (93). For receiving foreign listings, the top ten host markets are the 
United States (1198 listings), the United Kingdom (315), Luxembourg (251), Germany (183), 
France (104), New Zealand (91), Canada (89), Switzerland (87), and Netherlands (71).  
Across this broad sample, we observe a foreign listing premium in Tobin’s Q ratio for 
many subsamples, not just those on U.S. exchanges. Although we find, as other researchers do, 
that foreign listing on U.S. exchanges is associated with a substantial premium (a point estimate 
of Q premium of 0.25), we find that an average foreign listing premium is common to other 
exchanges, including listings in France, Japan, and Switzerland. The magnitude of this premium 
across the three mentioned markets is again similar to that in the United States, ranging between 
0.20 and 0.30. Our global comparison indicates that the value premium associated with a U.S. 
listing is hardly a unique phenomenon. 
We are also interested in the premium experienced by U.S. firms that list abroad.4 
Because of the unique features attributed to listing on U.S. exchanges, we are struck by our 
empirical observation that U.S. firms that list on non-U.S. exchanges experience a statistically 
equivalent foreign listing premium as do non-U.S. firms that list on U.S. exchanges. Further 
investigation of the foreign listing premium for U.S. firms reveals that it is remarkably persistent 
across time periods and host markets, and that the premium achieved by U.S. firms abroad is in 
fact larger than the foreign listing premium of Japanese, Indian, and Israeli firms traded abroad. 
We observe that firms from several other countries all show positive and significant foreign 
listing premiums, including British, Canadian, German, and Japanese firms, with Canadian and 
German firms exhibiting premium estimates identical to that of U.S. firms listed abroad (Q 
premium around 0.40).  
                                                            
4 Previous studies of U.S. firms that list abroad focused primarily on announcement effects (see, Howe and Kelm, 
1987; Lee, 1987; Torabzadeh, Bertin, and Zivney, 1992). Lau, Diltz, and Apilado (1994) observe that U.S. firms 
listing on the Tokyo and Basle exchanges are associated with poor long-run returns. 
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We investigate whether the legal environment of home and host markets explains the 
cross-sectional variation in foreign listing valuation effects and find that the foreign listing 
premium appears to have little positive correlation with standard measures of country-level 
investor protection rules. Our tests suggest that foreign firms cross-listed in countries with better 
legal standards achieve similar or slightly lower valuation gains than those that list in countries 
with weaker rule of law. These results hold irrespective of the legal protection proxy.  
To explain the valuation premium we note, however, that foreign listings are conducted 
by firms that already maintain high valuation ratios several years prior to the listing event. In 
tests that control for the level of pre-listing valuations, we find that the pre-listing Q largely 
explains the cross-sectional variation in post-listing valuation premium. To account for this 
observation, we augment all our earlier tests with an additional firm-level control – the firm’s Q 
ratio two years prior to the foreign listing event. This addition drastically changes most of our 
earlier findings. Accounting for the pre-listing valuation, we find that U.S. firms that are listed 
abroad no longer command a positive valuation premium over the whole sample or sub-periods 
relative to those that are listed only on U.S. domestic exchanges. Across other markets the 
changes are also substantive with the observed foreign listing premium disappearing for almost 
all markets.5 For example, foreign listings from Japan and the United Kingdom that showed great 
post-listing benefits in earlier tests now are associated with a significant foreign listing discount 
relative to domestic-only listed companies. The list of host markets with a significant foreign 
listing discount includes non-U.S. firms listed on U.S. exchanges. As discussed by Gozzi, Levine, 
and Schmukler (2008), although some of the foreign listing premium should dissipate as 
constrained growth opportunities are realized, a portion of the premium must be sustained as long 
as the institutional benefits espoused by the bonding explanation are affecting foreign-listed 
firms.  
                                                            
5 In all our tests, the only sample sub-group that sustains a foreign listing premium is Australian firms listing in New 
Zealand.  
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This paper contributes to the literature on foreign listings by further examining the 
valuation effects of a global sample of firms that choose to list on an equity exchange that is not 
located in their home country. Our results provide an interesting twist on the question posed by 
Doidge Karolyi, and Stulz (hereafter DKS, 2004) in the title of their paper “Why are foreign 
firms listed in the U.S. worth more?” Our observation that a foreign listing premium is not unique 
to U.S. listings motivates a broader explanation than that provided by the bonding theory. This 
may be due to a systematic tendency for firms with large growth opportunities to choose to list 
abroad. Alternatively such effects could be motivated by mangers acquiring opportunistic 
financing or managerial perquisites. Moreover, our finding that the pre-listing valuations explain 
variations in the foreign listing premium builds on work by Mittoo (2003), Gozzi, Levine, and 
Schmukler (2008), Sarkissian and Schill (2009), and King and Segal (2009) that documents the 
transitory nature of the foreign listing premium. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents that data sample. It 
describes the sample of U.S. and non non-U.S. firms with listings in foreign markets as well 
reports the summary statistics of firm level data. In Section 3, we perform the tests on valuation 
effects of U.S. firms listed abroad and compare the results with those for listings from other 
countries in a variety of host markets. In these estimations, we use a widely accepted modeling 
framework with no firm valuation control before the listing event. Section 4 repeats the earlier 
tests from Section 3 but controls for firm valuation prior to the listing. In this section, we also 
conduct a detailed estimation of the valuation premium around the listing event across various 
markets. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. The Data Sample  
2.1. The sample of foreign listings 
Our sample of foreign listings is comprised of 2,838 listings on foreign stock exchanges 
between 1985 and 2006. We select formal exchange listings only as this listing venue has been 
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shown previously to maintain the largest valuation effect for foreign listings. The sample period 
is constrained back in time by the availability of market and accounting data on Worldscope. This 
restriction is motivated by the fact that we perform many tests, for comparison purposes, using 
foreign listing data of firms outside the U.S. despite that the U.S. firm data comes from 
Compustat which maintains a much larger historical panel of data.  
The sample of foreign listings is constructed based on three surveys of world stock 
exchanges completed by the authors at the end of 1998, 2003, and 2006. Surveys were completed 
of all country exchanges indicated as having foreign listings by the World Federation of 
Exchanges except for corporate tax haven markets, such as the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, Jersey, 
and exchanges outside main boards of country stock exchanges. In each survey we asked the 
exchange research department for a summary of all foreign companies, excluding investment 
funds and trusts, listed on their exchange. In the 2003 and 2006 surveys we also asked for a 
history of all previous foreign companies that had since delisted their shares. For some exchanges 
(e.g., Tokyo) the requested data was available through the exchange website. Listings of foreign 
shares were received for all exchanges, although there was variation in the quality of the lists of 
delisted shares. In some cases full delisted share histories were received in other cases the lists 
were only partial (e.g., delists over the past 10 years) or unavailable.6 For the U.S. firms, 
approximately one-third of the sample listings had subsequently been delisted prior to 2006. Of 
those listings of the U.S. sample, where we could obtain explanations for the delisting, roughly 
half delisted because of a merger and half delisted as a voluntary delisting. Few of the firms were 
forced off by failing to meet the exchange listing requirements. These proportions are roughly in 
line with those reported by DKS (2009). It is worth noting that if survivorship bias influences the 
inference of our tests, the appropriate explanation for the valuation effect must have more to do 
with the events associated with delisting (such as merger gains) than with such explanations as 
legal bonding. 
                                                            
6 For outside the U.S., the incomplete delisted history was complemented with ADR delist codes from CRSP 
following the procedure of Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2008). The CRSP sample added a total of 202 listings to the 
final sample. 
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In Table 1, we provide the distribution of foreign listing between all pairs of home and 
host markets. The table also reports the total number of listings from each home country and in 
each host market. The ten largest suppliers of listings are Canada (483 listings), the U.S. (288), 
the U.K. (239), Australia (163), India (162), Japan (142), Israel (137), Netherlands (120), France 
(97), and Germany (93). We note that almost 90% of Canadian listings are placed on U.S. 
exchanges and about 75% of Indian listings are placed in Luxembourg. The U.S. and U.K. are the 
most active host markets, with 1198 and 315 listings, respectively. They are followed by 
Luxembourg (251 listings), Germany (183), France (104), New Zealand (91), Canada (89), 
Switzerland (87), and Netherlands (71). The data is consistent with strong bilateral home-host 
market pairs, such as that of Canada to the US (434 cross lists), India to Luxembourg (121), and 
Australia to New Zealand (87).  
Table 2 provides the distribution of 288 foreign listings of U.S. firms across the 17 host 
markets that occurred in the 1985 to 2006 period. The most common markets are Japan (68 
listings), Canada (56), Germany (43), and United Kingdom (33). The table also reports the 
number of listings for each of four time periods: 1985-1990 (134), 1991-1995 (42), 1996-2000 
(60), and 2001-2006 (52). There is some evidence of waves in foreign listing as in Schill and 
Sarkissian (2008) and Fernandes and Giannetti (2008) with Japan dominating the early sample 
period, Germany dominating the middle period, and Canada dominating the later period. The 
final column of the table shows the actual number of listings based on firm data availability. 
When we impose the availability of valuation data the overall number of foreign listings drops to 
244, but the relative importance of the top listing markets remains almost unchanged from the 
raw data in the preceding column (only Germany climbs to the second place replacing Canada). 
 
2.2. Firm characteristics of U.S. and non-U.S. firms 
The firm valuation ratios and characteristic controls are from Compustat and Worldscope. 
To construct our valuation measure, Tobin’s Q, for each firm, we follow the established practice 
in the literature. Specifically, we define Q as follows: 
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ValueAssetTotal
EquityofValueMarketEquityofValueBookValueAssetTotalQ +−= .   (1) 
 
The advantage of using Tobin’s Q is that it captures the value of firms’ intangible assets, and it is 
a forward looking risk-adjusted measure. The last point is particularly useful in international 
markets, since risk adjustment of stock returns in a global setting may rely on various asset 
pricing models. 
We construct control variables following DKS (2009). The first is a firm-specific sales 
growth measure, Sales Growth, defined as the inflation-adjusted two-year geometric average net 
sales growth. For each country, inflation is computed from local CPI changes using the 
International Monetary Fund estimates. To reduce the impact of outliers on our test results we 
winsorize the sales growth at the 1% level on both tails. The second control variable is a firm size 
variable, Log(Sales), defined as the natural logarithm of a firm’s net sales. The third variable, 
Industry Q, is the median global industry Q to capture the expected growth opportunities of each 
industry across all countries in our sample. 
Table 3 shows firm-level summary statistics for the sample of U.S. (Panel A) and non-
U.S. firms (Panel B) that list abroad and those that do not for both the whole sample period and 
two equal eleven year sub-periods of 1985 to 1995 and 1996 to 2006. The sample of U.S. firms 
has 86,786 firm-year observations, out of which 2,789 belong to foreign listing occurrences. We 
observe that the median Tobin’s Q of listed U.S. firms is higher than non-listed ones (1.50 for the 
foreign-listed firms versus 1.33 for the non-foreign listed firms). This difference may be masked 
by the differences in size (foreign listings are larger) and growth rate (foreign listings are slower 
growing) for the two samples such that it will be important to control for these characteristics in a 
regression framework.  
The sample of non-U.S. firms has 141,178 firm-year observations, out of which 13,168 
belong to firms with overseas listings. Again, we observe that the Tobin’s Q of listed firms is 
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higher than non-listed, and that listed firms have higher sales volume. However, the Q ratio of 
both foreign listed and non-listed non-U.S. firms is substantially smaller than that of U.S. firms in 
Panel A. The observed relations generally hold in both sub-samples with overall valuation levels 
as well as the difference in valuation ratios between foreign-listed and non-foreign-listed firms 
rising in the second sub-period. 
 
 
3. The Valuation Effects of Foreign Listing  
3.1. The Valuation Effect of Foreign-Listed U.S. firms 
We begin with a baseline analysis of the valuation benefits of foreign listing for the U.S. 
sample of firms using the Tobin’s Q measure as suggested in earlier studies (e.g., DKS, 2004, 
2009). The base regression model is specified as follows: 
 
j,ttij,t2j,t1
jij,t
εEffectsYearγQIndustryγLog(Sales)γthSales Growγ
δFLISTαQ
+++++
++=
43
,  (2) 
 
where Qj,t is the Tobin’s Q of firm j in industry i in year t of the listing firm, and jFLIST  denotes 
an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the year is greater than or equal to the foreign listing year 
of the firm. If a firm is listed on multiple foreign markets, the FLIST variable maintains a value 
of 1 following the first foreign listing. Since some U.S. firms established foreign listings prior to 
the beginning of the sample period, the FLIST value for these firms is equal to 1 throughout the 
sample period. In all regression specifications, we also account for calendar year effects, and 
cluster errors by firm.  
To examine the effects on U.S. firms from listing in different calendar periods, we also 
consider a specification where FLIST is replaced with interaction variables standing for specific 
time periods namely: 
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j,ttij,t2j,t1
jYij,t
εEffectsYearγQIndustryγLog(Sales)γthSales Growγ
YLYDFLISTδαQ
+++++
+=×+=
43
)(
,  (3) 
 
where D(LY = Y) is a dummy that takes the value of one for specific listing years, and we 
consider four sub-periods: 1985-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000, and 2001-2006. In a similar vein, 
to examine the effects on U.S. firms from listing on individual host markets, we also consider a 
specification where FLIST is replaced with interaction variables standing for particular markets, 
namely: 
 
j,ttij,t2j,t1
jXij,t
εEffectsYearγQIndustryγLog(Sales)γthSales Growγ
XHostDFLISTαQ
+++++
+=×+=
43
)(δ
,  (4) 
 
where D(Host = X) is a dummy that takes the value of one for a specific host market, and we 
consider the top three U.S. host markets: Japan, Canada, Germany, and all other host markets 
combined. 
 Table 4 reports the results of our pooled panel regression. We report the coefficient 
estimates, the t-statistics of the coefficients, the regression R-squares, and the total number of 
firm-year observations. Regression 1 reports the base result using equation (2). The coefficient on 
FLIST is positive (0.367) and highly significant (t-stat = 5.44) suggesting that U.S. firms that 
choose to list in foreign markets are associated with relatively high valuations. The magnitude of 
the foreign listing premium associated with U.S. firms is impressive given the nature of the 
common assumption in the literature that U.S. exchanges already provide superior trading and 
valuation attributes. One wonders on what basis investors bid up the value of equity for U.S. 
firms that also list in Germany or Japan.  
 In the next two columns of the table, we find that foreign listing valuation premium for 
U.S. firms is a rather consistent phenomenon. For example, in Regression 2, we split our 22-year 
sample period into four sub-periods and observe that listing premium is positive and significant 
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in every sub-period. Similarly, in Regression 3, which examines the benefits of various foreign 
markets for U.S. firms, we find that foreign listing gains do not concentrate in one market only 
but occur in Japan, Germany, and the rest of host markets excluding Canada. Moreover, in the 
last two columns of the table we estimate host market estimation premium over the first and 
second eleven-year periods of our sample, but again arrive generally to the same conclusion. 
Germany, Japan, and other markets outside Canada all provide positive and economically and/or 
statistically significant listing premium for U.S. firms in both time periods. Across all tests, it is 
not surprising to see positive and significant coefficients on sales growth and global industry 
valuation controls. Negative loading on log sales volume is also observed in DKS (2009). 
  
3.2. The Valuation Effect across the Top Ten Home and Host Markets 
 Having observed substantial premium for U.S. firms listed abroad, which is comparable 
to that of foreign firms listed in the U.S. known from previous studies, we now examine if this 
pattern is shared by foreign listings originated from and placed in other countries. First, we 
compare the performance of firms with presence on overseas exchanges from the top ten home 
markets identified in Section 2.1. In this setting, we add an interactive variable to equation (2) for 
each the top ten home markets, namely:  
 
j,ttij,tj,t
jXjij,t
εEffectsYearγQIndustryγLog(Sales)γthSales Growγ
XHomeDFLISTFLISTαQ
+++++
+=×++=
4321
)(δδ
.  (5) 
 
 Table 5 shows the foreign listing premium test results for the top ten home markets. As 
before, it reports the coefficient estimates, their t-statistics, the regression R-squares, and the total 
number of firm-year observations. Panel A shows the valuation premium for each individual 
home market based on equation (2). The test results in column 2 for U.S. firms listed abroad are 
the same as in column 1 of Table 4, but we report them here for the ease of comparison with 
other markets. Note that besides cross-listed U.S. firms, firms from such countries as Canada, the 
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United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany all show positive and significant foreign listing premium 
relative to their counterparts listed only in corresponding domestic exchanges. Remarkably, the 
magnitude of the foreign listing premium is similar across U.S., Canadian, and German firms 
(close to 0.40). It appears that Indian firms that list abroad are associated with systematically 
lower valuation ratios than those that do not. 
Panel B of Table 5 shows test results for the whole data panel using equation (5). 
Therefore, we add country fixed effects in all regressions. Regression (1) reports the average 
post-listing premium across all markets. It is highly significant with an annual magnitude of 0.17. 
Regression (2) adds the U.S. home market dummy. We observe that foreign-listed U.S. firms 
experience valuation premium significantly larger than those from other markets. The valuation 
premium for non-U.S. firms is 0.14. However, when we consider all top ten home markets in 
Regression (3), we again find that positive and significant valuation premium associated with 
U.S. firms listed abroad is not unique: Listings from Canada and the United Kingdom also 
achieve positive and significant post-listing valuations. In Regression (4), we slightly change the 
design of our experiment by dropping the U.S. home coefficient such that we can directly 
compare listing gains across all home markets with those of the United States. Note now that 
gains from overseas listing from the majority of home markets are statistically indistinguishable 
from those from the United States. Only firms from India, Japan, Israel, and some smaller 
markets outside the top ten reach significantly negative valuation ratios after the overseas 
placement relative to U.S. firms that list abroad. Table 5 establishes that the valuation behavior of 
U.S. firms listed abroad is shared among firms from many markets. 
 Next, we compare the performance of firms with foreign listings across the top ten host 
markets as identified in Section 2.1. Table 6 shows the foreign listing premium test results for the 
above ten host markets. Again, it provides the coefficient estimates with their t-statistics, the 
regression R-square values, and the total number of firm-year observations. Panel A reports the 
valuation premium for each individual host market based on equation (2). Similar to other 
researchers, we observe a positive and significant premium associated with foreign listing on 
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U.S. exchanges. The magnitude of this premium is 0.25, and it is comparable to that reported in 
other studies. We also observe positive and significant listing premium in such diverse counties 
in terms of their economic and institutional environment as Japan, France, and Switzerland, with 
magnitude being very close or even exceeding (as in the case of Switzerland) the value premium 
in the United States. The only host market associated with negative valuation effects to foreign 
firms is Luxembourg.7 
 Panel B of Table 6 shows test results for the whole data panel. To explore this setting, we 
add an interactive variable to equation (2) for each of the top ten host markets, as well as country 
fixed effects, namely:  
 
j,ttti
j,tj,tjXjij,t
εEffectsCountryγEffectsYearγQIndustryγ
Log(Sales)γthSales Growγ)XHost(DFLISTFLISTαQ
++++
++=×δ+δ+=
543
21 . (6) 
 
Regression (1) is the same as Regression (1) of Table 5 reporting the average post-listing 
premium across all markets. Regression (2) adds the U.S. host market dummy. As one could 
expect, we find that firms with foreign listings in the United States experience significantly larger 
valuation premium than those in other host markets. However, when we consider all top ten host 
markets in Regression (3), the value premium associated with listing on U.S. exchanges is no 
longer significantly different from that on exchanges outside the top ten host country group. 
Curiously, listings in Luxembourg show a significantly worse valuation than firms placed outside 
the top ten host markets. Therefore, we conclude that a positive and significant valuation 
premium associated with foreign firms listed in the United States is not unique. This conclusion 
is more directly supported using the format of Regression (4), where value premiums across 
various host markets are computed in their relation to that in the United States. In this setting, the 
                                                            
7 This result is consistent with India being the only home market with significantly negative foreign listing valuation 
since the majority of Indian firms are placed in Luxembourg (see Table 2).  
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only countries with significantly worse valuation impact on foreign firms than the United States 
are the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, and New Zealand (marginally).8  
Lastly, we want to compare directly the value premium associated with U.S. firms listed 
abroad to that of non-U.S. firms that list in the United States. To perform this direct test, we put 
home market and host market indicators together and estimate the following specification  
 
j,ttti
j,tj,t
jNjUSjij,t
εEffectsCountryγEffectsYearγQIndustryγ
Log(Sales)γthSales Growγ
)USHost,Home(DFLIST)USHost(DFLISTFLISTαQ
++++
+++
+≠×δ+=×δ+δ+=
543
21 , (7) 
 
where )USHost,Home(D ≠  is a dummy variable that indicates those foreign-listed firms that 
are neither U.S. firms nor listed on U.S. exchanges.  
Table 7 shows the test results with the usual information provided. Over the whole sample 
period in Regression (1) we find that the estimate for the FLIST variable is significant with a 
value of 0.31 per annum. Although the coefficient on the non-U.S. variable is negative and 
significant the value on the U.S. host variable is small (0.05) and insignificantly different from 
zero. This result implies that our test is not able to reject that the value premium associates with 
U.S. firms that list abroad is no different from the listing premium experienced by non-U.S. firms 
that list in the United States. This finding, which is consistently observed also in the sub-periods 
estimations in Regressions (2) and (3), provides a fundamental result for this paper that warrants 
further inquiry.  
 
3.3. The Valuation Impact of the “Rule of Law” 
                                                            
8 We may not preclude an observation of a careful reader that while the value premium of foreign listing in many 
markets is insignificantly different from that in the United States, it is negative and its statistical non-significance 
arises only because of relatively smaller size of listing data in those markets. While the sample size plays a role in 
this outcome, note that the economic magnitude of listings in Japan, France, and Switzerland is still comparable to 
that in the United States. 
 15
Many studies advocate the importance of good legal investor protection and overall 
financial market development for firm valuation.9 To test this claim on our data we use two 
investor protection proxies (the anti-self dealing index and an alternative anti-director index) 
from Djankov, et al. (2007). We focus on the impact on foreign listing valuation of the two “Rule 
of Law” variables in Table 8. It reports the regression test results (number of observations, point 
estimates, corresponding t-statistics, and R-square values) of valuation changes around foreign 
listings for the sub-samples of listings that are placed in better and worse “Rule of Law” 
countries. The first three columns show the results with anti-self-dealing index, while the last 
three – with anti-director index. A host country has a better “Rule of Law” with a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if its anti-self-dealing index or anti-director index is higher 
than that of the home country. The estimation results are shown for three data splits: U.S. firms 
listed abroad, foreign firms listed in the U.S., and foreign firms listed outside the U.S. (denoted as 
N/US). As in previous tables, we control for country effects when we deal with multiple home 
markets. 
We observe in column 1 of Table 8 that U.S. firms do not benefit from being listed in 
countries with better investor protection. Surprisingly, the largest valuation premium is 
associated with U.S. firms listed in countries with weaker shareholder protection rules. This 
outcome is generally supported in column 4 by the alternative “Rule of Law” proxy - director 
index. When we look at listings of foreign firms in the United States (columns 2 and 5), we find 
similar results – on average firms achieve no valuation benefits from being listed in countries 
with better investment and financial environment. Finally, consistent with the findings of Gozzi 
et al. (2008) and Sarkissian and Schill (2009), there is no premium associated with non-U.S. 
listings placed outside the United States in better or worse “Rule of Law” countries. Thus, Table 
                                                            
9 For instance, see Rajan and Zingales (1998), Levine and Zervos (1998), Benos and Weisbach (2004), Coffee (1999, 
2002), La Porta, et al. (1997, 1998), Reese and Weisbach (2002), Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003), Doidge (2004), 
Lins, Strickland, and Zenner (2005), Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004, 2007, 2008) for legal protection and financial 
market development arguments. There are some studies, however, that question the effectiveness of cross-listing on 
investor protection. For instance, Siegel (2004) and Gozzi, Levine, and Schmukler (2007) find that this impact is 
quite limited. 
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7 provides no evidence to suggest that listing in countries with better investment climate 
enhances the valuation gains of foreign listed firms.  
 
 
4. Revisiting the Valuation Effects of Foreign Listing  
4.1. A Detailed Event Window Examination 
We begin this section by performing a detailed valuation event study around the foreign 
listing event. To do this, we alter the foreign listing dummy variable to estimate the incremental 
Tobin’s Q ratio across a large multiyear window around the listing year. We split the listing 
dummy to eleven cross-listing indicators that correspond to the years before and years after the 
listing. The resulting regression model is as follows: 
 
( )
j,ttt
kj,t2j,t1
jij,t
εEffectsCountryγEffectsYearγ
QIndustryγLog(Sales)γthSales Growγ
FLISTδαQ
+++
++++
++= ∑+ −=
54
3
5
5ττ τ
,    (8) 
 
where the variables FLIST(τ) denote (i) each year between four years before and four years after 
the listing, FLIST(-/+n), where n is from -4 to +4, (ii) the listing year, FLIST(0), and (iii) two 
long-term periods of five or more years before and after the listing, FLIST(≤ -5) and 
FLIST(≥+5), respectively.  
The results of regressions that add the detailed listing indicators are reported in Table 9. 
As in Table 8, we show the estimation results for U.S. firms listed abroad, foreign firms listed in 
the United States, and foreign firms listed outside the U.S. (again denoted as N/US). As in 
previous tables, we control for country effects when we deal with multiple home markets. In 
column 1, we indeed see that U.S. firms cross-listed in other markets have positive and 
significant valuation premium even before the listing with magnitudes ranging between 0.54 and 
1.12. Very similar pattern is observed in column 2 among foreign firms listed in the United 
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States. Again, prior to the listing on U.S. exchanges, the would-be listed firms demonstrate 
significant overvaluation relative to firms that will not be listed overseas. The average premium 
of foreign firms with eventual listing in the United States in the five year period prior to the 
listing does not drop below an economically important 0.15 per year difference with non-listing 
firms. Even non-U.S. firms listed outside the United States (column 3) reach their highest 
overvaluation relative to only domestically listed firms around two years prior to the listing 
(FLIST(-2)), similar to U.S. firms listed abroad. Note that foreign listing premium after the listing 
does not decrease, retaining positive and significant values for cross-listed U.S. firms and foreign 
firms listed abroad (columns 1 and 2), but it decreases to zero for foreign firms placed outside the 
United States.  
To control for the pre-listing valuation measures we arbitrarily select the valuation ratio at 
Year -2 to use as a firm valuation control. We select Year -2 to best satisfy a desire to be as close 
as possible to the listing date but to predate the public announcement of the listing. The last three 
columns of Table 9 show the estimations with pre-listing firm valuation control. The resulting 
pattern is completely different from that in the first half of the table for all listing markets. The 
long-run (at or after year five from the listing event) valuation ratio of U.S. firms listed overseas 
as well as foreign firms listed in the United States or elsewhere is no different from that of firms 
that are listed solely on their corresponding domestic markets. Across all these three cases, the 
coefficient on FLIST(≥+5) is close to zero in both economic and statistical terms.10 In fact, there 
is not a single time dummy coefficient in the year of or following the listing that is significantly 
positive once the pre-listing Q control is included.  
We use this understanding of the pre-listing valuation effects to turn back to 
understanding the cross-sectional variation in listing premium. We construct a new variable: 
D(HfQ) which indicates whether the firm Q ratio prior to the listing exceeds the annual median 
                                                            
10 Gozzi, Levine, and Schmukler (2008) also find that the valuation advantage for their “internationalized” firms 
disappear soon after the internationalization event, including events such as foreign exchange listing. 
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value across all firms from the same home country. We use this variable in a pooled panel 
regression using the following specification. 
 
j,ttti
j,tj,tjQjij,t
εEffectsCountryγEffectsYearγQIndustryγ
Log(Sales)γthSales GrowγHfQDFLISTFLISTαQ
++++
++×++=
543
21)(δδ .  (9) 
 
The results from this estimation are reported in Table 10. We use two definitions of D(HfQ). The 
first is based on the Tobin’s Q value two years prior to the listing, as in Table 9. The second is 
based on the median Q value over all years prior to the listing year. Our tests are for the three 
subsamples used previously: U.S. firms listed abroad, foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges, and 
foreign firms listed outside the United States. In all six specifications, the coefficient on the 
D(HfQ) interaction variable is positive and highly significant and the coefficient on FLIST in 
isolation is insignificant. Our measure of the relative magnitude of the pre-listing valuation ratio 
appears to subsume any post-listing premium. The value premium of foreign listing appears to be 
largely driven by the pre-listing valuation ratio of firms that choose to list abroad. 
 
4.2. The Valuation Effect of Foreign-Listed U.S. firms  
The results in Table 4 show that U.S. firms consistently benefit from foreign listings to no 
lesser extent than foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges documented in Tables 6 and 7 and in 
many earlier studies. To alleviate the aforementioned potential bias in pre-listing period 
valuations, we repeat our estimations of regression models from Table 4 but now also control for 
each firm Q two years prior to the listing event. The test results are in Table 11 following the 
format of Table 4. Regression (1) shows that the inclusion of the firm level Q ratio drastically 
decreased the magnitude of the coefficient on FLIST from a positive and significant level of 0.37 
to negative 0.05. This implies that U.S. firms listed abroad on average achieve no extended 
valuation gains over those that do not list abroad. This result is the same across time since a 
similar firm-level adjustment in Regression (2) leads to insignificant coefficients across all four 
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sub-periods of our sample. Our tests of U.S. valuation gains across various host markets reveal 
that Germany is the only market that retains positive and significant premium over the full 
sample period for U.S. firms, although its magnitude is cut by 50% in comparison to the 
corresponding result in Table 4. In addition, the addition of the firm Q control into the estimation 
greatly increases the fit of the regression.11 Thus, the evidence from Table 11 illustrates that after 
controlling for the pre-listing valuation levels, U.S. firms listed abroad do not appear to be 
associated with a consistent and sustainable valuation gains from listing. 
 
4.3. The Valuation Effect across the Top Ten Home and Host Markets with Firm Q Control 
 The next logical step is to compare the impact of firm Q control on U.S. firms listed 
abroad with that on listings from other home and in other host markets. We conduct these 
adjusted tests across home markets in Table 12. The format of this table is similar to Table 5, 
Panel A. As before, we repeat the outcome for U.S. firms listed abroad to simplify the 
comparison of results across all top ten home markets. We find that after controlling for firm pre-
listing Q, the only market that shows significant post listing valuation is Australia. However, the 
list of countries with negative and significant post-listing valuation ratios expands from only one 
market (India) in Table 5 to four that includes now, besides India, the United Kingdom, Japan, 
and Israel.  
 We now turn to the impact of the pre-listing firm-level valuation control on the average 
foreign listing gains in each of the top ten host markets. We conduct this estimation in Table 13 
following the same format as Table 6, Panel A. Most importantly, we find that the significance 
disappears for the U.S. hosted FLIST variable. The result implies that there is no evidence that 
non-U.S. firms listed on U.S. exchanges maintain any valuation premium over firms that are not. 
In fact, the negative and significant coefficient on FLIST suggests that U.S.-listed firms trade at a 
discount once the pre-listing Q has been considered. Note that with firm Q control, foreign firms 
                                                            
11 We have also experimented with an alternative proxy for the pre-listing firm valuation control – the median firm Q 
prior to the listing. The results of these tests are qualitatively similar to those presented in Table 9 and subsequent 
tables.  
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gain, or, speaking more correctly, lose, about the same value after being listed in the United 
States and the United Kingdom. The point estimates in both markets are remarkably similar to 
each other equaling negative 0.163 to 0.168. The only three host markets that shows positive, yet 
largely insignificant premium for cross-listed firms are Germany, Japan, New Zealand, and 
Canada. 
To better visualize the valuation patterns around the listing across all top ten home and 
host markets, we plot the listing valuation premium in Figure 1 (home markets) and Figure 2 
(host markets). For these plots, we estimate regression model (8) both without and with firm pre-
listing valuation control (pre-listing Q two years prior to the listing). In both figures, the diamond 
thick curve denotes listing premium without firm valuation control, while the circled thin curve 
denotes listing premium with firm valuation control. These figures clearly show the markets 
where controlling for the firm pre-listing Q ratio makes a profound difference in estimation 
results and implications. Importantly, the effect of this adjustment on many home markets (e.g., 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan) and many host markets (e.g., again the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, as well as France, Switzerland, and the Netherlands) is 
very similar: it greatly reduces the observed valuation premium around the listing. We observe 
that the four host markets with significant foreign listing premium in Table 6 share a common 
profile in the time series: each of these host markets (France, Japan, Switzerland, and the U.S.) 
experience high valuations prior to the listing year  
 
4.4. Market Valuation Effects in Foreign Listing 
 The market governance metric tests in Table 8 provided little ability to explain cross-
sectional variation in foreign listing premium by market. To explore this variation further with 
respect to valuation ratios, we propose a test that includes a variable that measures the relative 
valuation levels across markets. In the context of home markets, the variable D(HmQ) is set to 
one if the median Q ratio of all firms in the home market in a given year exceeds the relative 
median Q ratio for all countries in that year.  In effect, this variable tests whether the variation in 
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foreign listing premium we observe across markets is related to the overall variation of the 
valuation of the home market. We perform a similar exercise for the host markets. In the panel 
regression, we interact this variable with FLIST and include the lagged firm Q ratio.  
 In Table 14, we report the results by home market and host market for our three 
subsamples: foreign listings of U.S. firms, foreign listings on U.S. exchanges, and foreign listings 
of non-U.S. firms on non-U.S. exchanges. The coefficient on the interaction term 
FLIST*D(HmQ) is significant in four out of six regressions. The findings suggest that the foreign 
listing premium is higher for U.S. firms listing abroad when the U.S. market Q ratio is relatively 
high. The foreign listing premium is higher for foreign listings to U.S. exchanges when the home 
market and the U.S. market Q ratios are relatively high. Lastly, the evidence for foreign listings 
of non-U.S. firms on non-U.S. exchanges suggests a reversal effect in that high host market Q 
ratios are associated with a lower sustained foreign listing premium. The evidence suggests again 
that valuation ratios, even at the market level provide more cross-sectional explanatory power 
than do measures of the rule of law.  
  
 
5. Conclusions 
An expanding literature asserts that non-U.S. firms achieve unique value benefits from 
listing on U.S. equity markets. In this paper we examine the foreign listing premium across a 
broad set of home and host markets, including U.S. firms that list on non-U.S. stock exchanges. 
We find that the value premium of U.S. firms that list abroad is similar to that of non-U.S. firms 
that list in the United States, and that many other home and host markets show a foreign listing 
premium. We do not find that investors reward managers for bonding to more stringent legal or 
disclosure requirements. 
We observe that listings on foreign exchanges are conducted by firms that already have 
relatively high valuations several years prior to the listing. Moreover, there is evidence that firms 
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that achieve large foreign listing effects originate from or list on exchanges with high valuations.  
We demonstrate that the foreign listing premium disappears once we control for the firm’s pre-
listing valuation ratio. Our evidence calls into question the linkage between the value 
implications of foreign listings and the unique institutional features of the U.S. market that is 
prevalent in many existing explanations of the foreign listing decision. Instead, the evidence is 
consistent with such as explanations as a systematic tendency for firms with growth opportunities 
(as measured by Tobin’s Q) to list abroad, opportunistic foreign market financing, or acquisition 
of managerial perquisites from listing abroad when valuations are high. Regardless, there is 
strong empirical evidence that foreign listings are attractive to managers of firms with recent 
histories of abnormally high valuation.  
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Table 1 
Distribution of overseas listings across all home and host markets in 1985-2006 
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Argentina     1  4   2 1 20 28
Australia      13 1 2 6 1 87  5 3 2 9 34 163
Austria    1   2 6   1 1 1 12
Belgium       2 2 5 6  1 3 19
Brazil       4   1 33 38
Canada  7  6   5 3 1 6 1 3 1 5 5 6 434 483
Chile         1 25 26
China         2 6 29 37
Columbia      1 3   1 5
Croatia         1 1
Cyprus         1 1
Czech Republic         1 4 5
Denmark        1 1 1 1 5 9
Egypt         7 7
Estonia         1 1
Finland       1 2 1 1   4 2 5 16
France    10  1 10  9 4 2 12   3 3 6 37 97
Germany   9 1   5 8 9 1 7   1 2 2 16 5 27 93
Ghana      1   1 2
Greece  1     1 1 1  1 1 9 10 25
Guyana      1   1
Hong Kong  8     1  1 9 1 16 36
Hungary   3    5   1 4 1 14
Iceland         1 1 2
India       121   2 24 15 162
Indonesia  1     2   2 4 9
Ireland       1  41 18 60
Israel    4   2 3  1 3 12 112 137
Italy    2   5 5 4   1 2 17 36
Japan    1   24 46 13   5 6 27 20 142
Jordan         1 1
Kazakhstan         2 2
Korea (South)       1 22   17 16 56
Lebanon       2   2
Liechtenstein         1 1
Lithuania         1 1
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Table 1 (continued) 
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Luxembourg    4   5 2   2 1 4 4 8 30
Malaysia  1     1   1 3
Malta         1 1
Mexico         38 38
Morocco       1   1 2
Netherlands   1 6   11 24 3 2 4   2 1 1 1 15 11 38 120
New Zealand  26       7 33
Nigeria         1 1
Norway       1 1 1   1 2 4 11 21
Oman         1 1
Panama         2 2
Peru         3 3
Philippines       5   2 1 8
Poland       1   11 12
Portugal       1 1   1 4 7
Qatar         1 1
Romania         1 1
Russia         10 6 16
Singapore  3     3   2 6 14
Slovakia       2   1 3
South Africa    6  4 1 6 5   1 7 11 41
Spain 1    1  2 3 2 4 4   2 2 5 11 37
Sri Lanka       1   1
Sweden    1  1 7 2 4 3 1  5 2 4 2 13 45
Switzerland   2 1  2 4 10 4 1   3 5 15 47
Taiwan       47   1 11 9 68
Thailand       2   2 1 5
Tunisia         1 1
Turkey       2   9 1 12
United Kingdom  4  5  8 1 15 10 1 17 1 16 3 7 2 3 7 7 2 2 1 127 239
United States  8 2 5 1 56 18 43 4 68 2 1 12  5 1 8 21 33 288
Venezuela      1 1   3 5
Zimbabwe         1 1 2
Total 1 59 17 53 3 89 10 2 104 183 2 17 5 23 125 251 1 71 91 21 1 5 2 41 19 5 31 87 3 3 315 1198 2838
 
This table provides the country-to-country frequency distribution of the sample of overseas listings between 1985 and 2006. The total sample is comprised of 
2,838 overseas listings from 69 home markets placed in 32 host markets. Listings from or in pure tax haven countries and outside main exchanges are omitted. 
Table 2 
Distribution of foreign listings of U.S. firms in 1985-2006 
 
 
Host markets 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 2001-06 Total Sample 
Japan 68 0 0 0 68 64 
Canada 5 9 8 34 56 32 
Germany 4 18 20 1 43 41 
United Kingdom 19 5 5 4 33 28 
Switzerland 16 1 3 1 21 20 
France 13 1 4 0 18 16 
Netherlands 4 1 6 1 12 11 
Australia 1 3 3 1 8 8 
Sweden 1 1 4 2 8 7 
Belgium 3 1 1 0 5 5 
Norway 0 0 4 1 5 2 
Israel 0 0 0 4 4 4 
Austria 0 1 0 1 2 2 
Luxembourg 0 1 0 1 2 1 
Brazil 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Mexico 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Peru 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Total 134 42 60 52 288 244 
 
This table provides the frequency distribution of the sample of overseas listings of U.S. firms between 1985 and 
2006. Listings in pure tax haven countries and outside main exchanges are omitted. The last column shows the 
number of listings based on firm sample data availability. 
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Table 3 
Summary statistics firm-level information of U.S. and non-U.S. firms 
 
 
Panel A: U.S. firms 
 Whole sample period 1985-1995 1996-2006 
 Mean Median St. Dev. Mean Median St. Dev. Mean Median St. Dev. 
 Foreign-listed firms 
Obs: 2,789   1,382   1,407   
Firm Q 1.934 1.495 1.497 1.738 1.371 1.342 2.125 1.603 1.612 
Sales ($mln) 16,336 8,898 23,627 14,164 8,260 19,738 18,469 10,100 26,742 
Sales Growth 0.162 0.085 0.261 0.158 0.086 0.227 0.165 0.084 0.291 
 Non-foreign-listed firms 
Obs: 83,997   36,440   47,557   
Firm Q 1.932 1.333 1.821 1.767 1.279 1.540 2.059 1.385 2.001 
Sales ($mln) 1,614 118 7,702 1,535 110 7,421 1,674 125 7,910 
Sales Growth 0.301 0.155 0.472 0.291 0.156 0.447 0.309 0.154 0.489 
 
 
Panel B: Non-U.S. firms 
 Whole sample period 1985-1995 1996-2006 
 Mean Median St. Dev. Mean Median St. Dev. Mean Median St. Dev. 
 Foreign-listed firms 
Obs: 13,168   4,489   8,679   
Firm Q 1.618 1.233 1.307 1.442 1.181 0.827 1.709 1.282 1.488 
Sales ($mln) 9,977 2,109 20,296 9,149 2,993 17,601 9,847 1,338 21,449 
Sales Growth 0.251 0.151 0.346 0.297 0.187 0.344 0.231 0.144 0.340 
 Non-foreign-listed firms 
Obs: 128,106   32,780   95,326   
Firm Q 1.562 1.181 1.393 1.462 1.230 0.901 1.597 1.159 1.524 
Sales ($mln) 1,406 133 6,768 2,100 359 7,145 1,167 93 6,617 
Sales Growth 0.256 0.146 0.385 0.238 0.146 0.318 0.262 0.146 0.406 
 
This table reports the summary statistics of three firm characteristics for a panel of U.S. and non-U.S. firms. Firm’s 
Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio, where the numerator is Total Asset Value minus Book Value of Equity plus Market 
Value of Equity, while the denominator is the Total Asset Value. Sales is a firm’s net sales. Sales Growth is defined 
as the inflation-adjusted two-year geometric average net sales growth. For each country, inflation is computed from 
local CPI changes using the International Monetary Fund data. Sales Growth is winsorized at the 1% level on both 
tails.  
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Table 4 
Foreign listing premium for U.S. firms 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Observations 86,786 86,786 86,786 
  
Intercept -0.374*** -0.374*** -0.372*** 
 (-4.93) (-4.93) (-4.92) 
FLIST 0.367***   
 (5.44)   
FLIST ×  D(LY = 1985-1990)  0.312***  
  (3.85)  
FLIST ×  D(LY = 1991-1995)  0.225***  
  (3.15)  
FLIST ×  D(LY = 1996-2000)  0.597***  
  (5.95)  
FLIST ×  D(LY = 2001-2006)  0.288***  
  (3.30)  
FLIST × D(Host = Japan)   0.388*** 
   (4.43) 
FLIST × D(Host = Canada)   0.008 
   (0.04) 
FLIST × D(Host = Germany)   0.603*** 
   (3.00) 
FLIST × D(Host = Other)   0.329*** 
   (3.83) 
Sales Growth 0.524*** 0.524*** 0.524*** 
 (20.76) (20.79) (20.80) 
Log (Sales) -0.083*** -0.083*** -0.083*** 
 (-13.22) (-13.21) (-13.29) 
Industry Q 1.710*** 1.710*** 1.710*** 
 (35.42) (35.45) (35.44) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.161 0.161 0.161 
 
This table reports the regression test results for a panel of U.S. firms across different host markets, time periods, and 
industry and firm characteristics. The dependent variable is firm’s Tobin’s Q. Firm’s Q is defined as the ratio, where 
the numerator is Total Asset Value minus Book Value of Equity plus Market Value of Equity, while the denominator 
is the Total Asset Value. Sales Growth is defined as the inflation-adjusted two-year geometric average net sales 
growth. For each country, inflation is computed from local CPI changes using the International Monetary Fund data. 
Sales Growth is winsorized at the 1% level on both tails. Log(Sales) is the natural logarithm of firm’s net sales. 
Industry Q is the median global industry Q per year. The listing indicator FLIST is equal to 1 for years after the 
foreign listing. FLIST × D(LY = “time period”) denotes listing in specific listing years. FLIST× D(Host = “country 
name”) denotes listing in a specific host market. Each regression sample includes all firms except home firms from 
the given host market. The table also shows the R-squares and, in parentheses, the t-statistics. The year fixed effects 
are included in each regression but the coefficients are not shown. Standard errors are clustered by the firm. 
Notations *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Table 5 
Foreign listing premium for the top ten home markets 
 
Panel A: Individual home market tests 
 Canada US UK Australia India 
Observations 7,129 86,786 15,865 4,552 2,640 
   
Intercept 0.678*** -0.374*** -0.435** -0.330 0.523 
 (3.32) (-4.93) (-2.50) (-1.13) (0.14) 
FLIST 0.396*** 0.367*** 0.220* 0.110 -0.383** 
 (4.00) (5.44) (1.95) (1.08) (-2.53) 
Sales Growth 0.189*** 0.524*** 0.288*** 0.046 0.509*** 
 (3.75) (20.76) (6.76) (0.82) (2.73) 
Log (Sales) -0.139*** -0.082*** -0.052*** -0.086*** 0.123*** 
 (-7.83) (-13.22) (-4.74) (-4.82) (3.07) 
Industry Q 1.183*** 1.710*** 1.589*** 1.129*** 1.736*** 
 (8.08) (35.42) (15.20) (5.73) (6.72) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.162 0.161 0.141 0.108 0.160 
 
 
Panel A (continued) 
 Japan Israel Netherlands France Germany 
Observations 30,733 550 2,501 7,386 8,496 
   
Intercept 0.209* -0.009 -1.255*** -0.098 1.122*** 
 (1.79) (-0.02) (-2.80) (-0.28) (4.42) 
FLIST 0.185*** 0.150 0.093 0.232 0.392*** 
 (3.42) (1.12) (0.50) (1.49) (2.36) 
Sales Growth 1.663*** 0.160 0.887*** 0.495*** 0.334*** 
 (12.69) (0.86) (3.92) (4.92) (4.95) 
Log (Sales) -0.088*** -0.004 -0.047* -0.073*** -0.122*** 
 (-11.04) (-0.14) (-1.86) (-2.72) (-7.95) 
Industry Q 0.865*** 0.916*** 1.851*** 1.306*** 0.839*** 
 (14.61) (3.92) (5.05) (10.51) (6.24) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.186 0.213 0.276 0.196 0.163 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Panel tests  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Observations 228,060 228,060 228,060 228,060 
  
Intercept -0.823*** -0.813*** -0.799*** -0.799*** 
 (-12.02) (-11.83) (-11.30) (-11.30) 
FLIST 0.168*** 0.135*** 0.082 0.308*** 
 (5.92) (4.33) (1.58) (4.54) 
FLIST × D(Home = Canada)   0.223** -0.002 
   (2.08) (-0.02) 
FLIST × D(Home = US)  0.172** 0.226***  
  (2.29) (2.61)  
FLIST × D(Home = UK)   0.216* -0.009 
   (1.76) (-0.08) 
FLIST × D(Home = Australia)   0.020 -0.205 
   (0.16) (-1.52) 
FLIST × D(Home = India)   -0.213 -0.439*** 
   (-1.34) (-2.66) 
FLIST × D(Home = Japan)   0.005 -0.220** 
   (0.07) (-2.52) 
FLIST × D(Home = Israel)   -0.090* -0.317** 
   (-1.68) (-2.26) 
FLIST × D(Home = Netherlands)   0.112 -0.113 
   (0.65) (-0.64) 
FLIST × D(Home = France)   0.146 -0.079 
   (1.03) (-0.53) 
FLIST × D(Home = Germany)   0.109 -0.116 
   (0.69) (-0.71) 
FLIST × D(Home = Other)    -0.226*** 
    (-2.61) 
Sales Growth 0.472*** 0.472*** 0.472*** 0.472*** 
 (30.63) (30.65) (30.65) (30.65) 
Log (Sales) -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.070*** 
 (-18.63) (-18.67) (-18.63) (-18.63) 
Industry Q 1.412*** 1.412*** 1.412*** 1.412*** 
 (45.47) (45.47) (45.47) (45.47) 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.149 0.149 0.149  0.149 
 
This table reports the valuation premium from foreign listing in the top ten home markets. These markets include 
Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, India, Japan, Israel, the Netherlands, France, and 
Germany. Panel A reports results for individual countries, while Panel B – for the entire data panel. The dependent 
variable is firm’s Tobin’s Q. FLIST × D(Home = “country name”) denotes listing from a specific home market. 
Firm’s Q and all other variables are defines as in Table 4. The table also shows the adjusted R-squares and, in 
parentheses, the t-statistics. Standard errors are clustered by the firm. The year and country (when necessary) fixed 
effects are included in each regression but the coefficients are not shown. Notations *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Foreign listing premium for the top ten host markets 
 
Panel A: Individual host market tests 
 US UK Luxembourg Germany Japan 
Observations 228,060 228,060 228,060 228,060 228,060 
   
Intercept -0.848*** -0.812*** -0.812*** -0.809*** -0.808*** 
 (-12.28) (-11.83) (-11.85) (-12.82) (-11.75) 
FLIST 0.246*** 0.027 -0.100* 0.105 0.198*** 
 (4.82) (0.61) (-1.65) (1.31) (3.48) 
Sales Growth 0.472*** 0.472*** 0.472*** 0.472*** 0.473*** 
 (30.66) (30.67) (30.67) (30.66) (30.68) 
Log (Sales) -0.067*** -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.067*** 
 (-17.75) (-17.48) (-17.40) (-17.72) (-17.67) 
Industry Q 1.412*** 1.417*** 1.417*** 1.417*** 1.417*** 
 (45.31) (45.39) (45.38) (45.39) (45.37) 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.149 0.149 0.149 0.149 0.149 
 
 
Panel A (continued) 
 France New Zealand Canada Switzerland Netherlands 
Observations 228,060 228,060 228,060 228,060 228,060 
   
Intercept -0.810*** -0.811*** -0.812*** -0.809*** -0.811*** 
 (-11.82) (-11.83) (-11.84) (-11.79) (-11.84) 
FLIST 0.197*** 0.070 0.003 0.300** 0.110 
 (2.82) (0.86) (0.02) (2.32) (1.05) 
Sales Growth 0.473*** 0.473*** 0.473*** 0.473*** 0.473*** 
 (30.66) (30.67) (30.68) (30.67) (30.67) 
Log (Sales) -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.066*** 
 (-17.61) (-17.47) (-17.45) (-17.58) (-17.54) 
Industry Q 1.417*** 1.417*** 1.417*** 1.417*** 1.417*** 
 (45.41) (45.38) (45.38) (45.39) (45.42) 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.149 0.149 0.149 0.149 0.149 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Panel tests    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Observations 228,060 228,060 228,060 228,060 
  
Intercept -0.823*** -0.823*** -0.835 -0.835*** 
 (-12.02) (-12.15) (-12.16) (-12.16) 
FLIST 0.168*** 0.133*** 0.180** 0.259*** 
 (5.92) (4.34) (2.51) (5.04) 
FLIST × D(Host = US)  0.125** 0.079  
  (2.28) (0.93)  
FLIST × D(Host = UK)   -0.129 -0.209*** 
   (-1.56) (-3.32) 
FLIST × D(Host = Luxembourg)   -0.264*** -0.343*** 
   (-2.89) (-4.25) 
FLIST × D(Host = Germany)   -0.050 -0.129 
   (-0.50) (-1.38) 
FLIST × D(Host = Japan)   0.041 -0.038 
   (0.45) (-0.52) 
FLIST × D(Host = France)   0.041 -0.038 
   (0.41) (-0.49) 
FLIST × D(Host = New Zealand)   -0.082 -0.161* 
   (-0.76) (-1.74) 
FLIST × D(Host = Canada)   -0.159 -0.238 
   (-0.86) (-1.34) 
FLIST × D(Host = Switzerland)   0.146 0.066 
   (1.00) (0.48) 
FLIST × D(Host = Netherlands)   -0.045 -0.124 
   (-0.35) (-1.08) 
FLIST × D(Host = Other)    -0.079 
    (-0.93) 
Sales Growth 0.472*** 0.472*** 0.473*** 0.473*** 
 (30.63) (30.63) (30.66) (30.66) 
Log (Sales) -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.070*** 
 (-18.43) (-18.43) (-18.55) (-18.55) 
Industry Q 1.412*** 1.412*** 1.410*** 1.410*** 
 (45.34) (45.34) (45.36) (45.40) 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.149 0.149 0.149  0.149 
 
This table reports the valuation premium from foreign listing in the top eight host markets. These markets include the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Germany, Japan, France, New Zealand, Canada, Switzerland, and 
the Netherlands. The entire panel of data is used in both Panel A and B, while Panel A reports individual host market 
effects while Panel B reports joint effects. The dependent variable is firm’s Tobin’s Q. FLIST × D(Host = “country 
name”) denotes listing is a specific host market. Firm’s Q and all other variables are defines as in Table 4. The table 
also shows the adjusted R-squares and, in parentheses, the t-statistics. Standard errors are clustered by the firm. The 
year and country (when necessary) fixed effects are included in each regression but the coefficients are not shown. 
Notations *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Tests of post-listing valuation of U.S. firms listed abroad and foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges  
 
   
 All 1985-1995 1996-2006 
Observations 228,060 75,091 152,969 
  
Intercept -0.833*** -0.472*** -0.548*** 
 (-12.05) (-3.58) (-7.80) 
FLIST 0.306*** 0.218*** 0.368*** 
 (4.51) (3.63) (4.33) 
FLIST×  D(Host = US) -0.050 0.084 0.128 
 (-0.59) (0.89) (-1.26) 
FLIST×  D(Home, Host ≠ US) -0.233*** -0.105 -0.317*** 
 (-3.05) (-1.44) (-3.38) 
Sales Growth 0.472*** 0.532*** 0.441*** 
 (30.66) (19.20) (24.19) 
Log (Sales) -0.070*** -0.072*** -0.072*** 
 (-18.59) (-15.23) (-15.34) 
Industry Q 1.410*** 1.329*** 1.422*** 
 (45.38) (25.70) (42.27) 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.149 0.141 0.157 
 
This table reports the valuation changes around foreign listings for U.S. firms listed abroad and foreign firms listed 
in the United States for the whole sample period as well as two eleven-year sub-periods. The dependent variable is 
firm’s Tobin’s Q. D(Home, Host ≠ US) is a dummy that takes the value of one for listing of a non-U.S. firms on a 
non-U.S. foreign exchange. FLIST in this table is equivalent to a dummy that takes the value of one for U.S listings 
abroad. All other variables are defines as in Table 4. The table also shows the adjusted R-squares and, in parentheses, 
the t-statistics. Standard errors are clustered by the firm. The year and country (when necessary) fixed effects are 
included in each regression but the coefficients are not shown. Notations *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Impact of the “Rule of Law” on valuation of U.S. and non-U.S. firms listed abroad 
 
   
 Anti-Self-Dealing Index Anti-Director Index 
 US firms US listings N/US listings US firms US listings N/US listings 
Observations 86,786 141,178 141,178 86,786 141,178 141,178 
    
Intercept -0.373*** -0.612*** -0.600*** -0.374*** -0.580*** -0.601*** 
 (-4.92) (-5.62) (-5.61) (-4.92) (-5.37) (-5.62) 
FLIST 0.400*** 0.219*** 0.012 0.400*** 0.269*** 0.020 
 (5.56) (3.07) (0.29) (4.26) (5.21) (0.54) 
FLIST×D(Law) -0.220* 0.042 0.039 -0.220 -0.184* 0.029 
 (-1.78) (0.48) (0.86) (-1.43) (-1.70) (0.67) 
Sales Growth 0.524*** 0.423*** 0.424*** 0.524*** 0.423*** 0.424*** 
 (20.76) (23.05) (23.08) (20.76) (23.06) (23.08) 
Log (Sales) -0.083*** -0.056*** -0.055*** -0.083*** -0.056*** -0.055*** 
 (-13.24) (-12.84) (-12.50) (-13.25) (-12.84) (-12.50) 
Industry Q 1.709*** 1.534*** 1.546*** 1.709*** 1.534*** 1.546*** 
 (35.43) (32.53) (32.68) (35.43) (32.54) (32.68) 
Country effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.161 0.136 0.136 0.161 0.136 0.136 
 
This table reports the regression test results of valuation changes around foreign listings for the sub-samples of 
listings that are placed in better and worse “Rule of Law” countries. First three columns show the results with anti-
self dealing index, the last three – with anti-director index. Both indexes are from Djankov, et al. (2008). A host 
country has a better “Rule of Law” with a dummy variable D(Law) which takes the value of one if its anti-self-
dealing index or anti-director index is higher than that of the home country. The estimation results are shown three 
data splits: U.S. firms listed abroad, foreign firms listed in the U.S., and foreign firms listed outside the U.S. (N/US). 
The dependent variable is firm’s Tobin’s Q. Firm’s Q and all other variables are defines as in Table 4. The table also 
shows the adjusted R-squares and, in parentheses, the t-statistics. Standard errors are clustered by the firm. The year 
and country (when necessary) fixed effects are included in each regression but the coefficients are not shown. 
Notations *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9 
The time series of the value premium around foreign listing 
 
 
 No firm valuation control  With firm valuation control 
 US firms US listings N/US listings US firms US listings N/US listings 
Observations 86,786 141,178 141,178 86,114 137,529 137,529 
    
Intercept -0.373*** -0.611*** -0.602*** -0.428*** -0.347*** -0.365*** 
 (-4.92) (-5.65) (-5.64) (-9.48) (-4.13) (-4.55) 
FLIST( ≤ -5) 0.543** 0.234** 0.038 -0.0421** -0.006 -0.129*** 
 (2.35) (2.46) (0.83) (-2.10) (-0.05) (-2.69) 
FLIST (-4) 0.747*** 0.197** 0.121* -0.076 0.019 -0.131** 
 (2.88) (2.26) (1.95) (-0.49) (0.30) (-2.29) 
FLIST(-3) 0.754*** 0.149 0.066 -0.002 -0.196** -0.207*** 
 (3.09) (1.58) (1.40) (-0.01) (-2.41) (-5.07) 
FLIST(-2) 1.115*** 0.309** 0.187*** 0.030 -0.159*** -0.065** 
 (3.77) (2.48) (2.92) (0.58) (-4.02) (-2.39) 
FLIST(-1) 0.709*** 0.390*** 0.112** 0.032 0.006 -0.099** 
 (4.00) (3.53) (1.97) (0.33) (0.07) (-2.17) 
FLIST(0) 0.431*** 0.472*** 0.143*** -0.238* 0.020 -0.102** 
 (3.45) (4.15) (2.87) (-1.87) (0.20) (-2.46) 
FLIST(+1) 0.332*** 0.270*** 0.103** -0.366** -0.198** -0.202*** 
 (3.84) (3.13) (2.15) (-2.01) (-1.96) (-3.72) 
FLIST(+2) 0.328*** 0.300*** 0.040 -0.078 -0.433*** -0.254*** 
 (3.61) (3.39) (0.81) (-0.61) (-2.64) (-4.41) 
FLIST(+3) 0.250** 0.330*** 0.008 -0.589*** -0.449*** -0.269*** 
 (2.40) (3.90) (0.16) (-2.59) (-2.99) (-4.53) 
FLIST(+4) 0.332*** 0.217*** -0.023 -0.237 -0.385*** -0.210*** 
 (3.11) (3.02) (-0.58) (-1.06) (-2.83) (-4.07) 
FLIST( ≥ +5) 0.411*** 0.198*** 0.018 0.087 -0.002 -0.041 
 (5.40) (3.78) (0.46) (0.68) (-0.03) (-0.80) 
Sales Growth 0.524*** 0.421*** 0.423*** 0.198*** 0.139*** 0.140*** 
 (20.76) (22.94) (22.99) (9.59) (9.59) (10.89) 
Log (Sales) -0.083*** -0.057*** -0.056*** -0.034*** -0.031*** -0.028*** 
 (-13.24) (-12.97) (-12.67) (-9.82) (-9.82) (-10.64) 
Industry Q 1.709*** 1.532*** 1.546*** 0.601*** 0.616*** 0.614*** 
 (35.43) (32.45) (32.64) (15.91) (15.91) (16.25) 
Firm Q (-2)    0.919*** 0.951*** 0.951*** 
    (38.54) (38.54) (59.48) 
Country effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.161 0.136 0.136 0.481 0.530 0.530 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
 
This table reports the regression test results of valuation changes around foreign listing for three data splits: U.S. 
firms listed abroad, foreign firms listed in the U.S., and foreign firms listed outside the U.S. (N/US). The first (last) 
three columns report estimation results without (with) the firm pre-listing valuation control. The listing indicator 
FLIST is split to eleven cross-listing indicators that correspond to the years before and years after the listing. These 
variables denote (i) each year between four years before and four years after the listing, FLIST(-/+τ), where τ is from 
-4 to +4, (ii) the listing year, FLIST(0), and (iii) two long-term periods of five or more years before and after the 
listing, FLIST( ≤ -5) and FLIST(≥  +5) respectively. The dependent variable is firm’s Tobin’s Q. Firm Q (-2) is the 
firm’s Q two years prior to the listing. Firm’s Tobin’s Q and all other variables are defines as in Table 4. The table 
also shows the adjusted R-squares and, in parentheses, the t-statistics. Standard errors are clustered by the firm. The 
year and country (when necessary) fixed effects are included in each regression but the coefficients are not shown. 
Notations *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 10 
Post-listing valuation of high and low valued firms 
 
   
 Firm Q (-2) Firm Q (pre-listing median) 
 US firms US listings N/US listings US firms US listings N/US listings
Observations 86,786 141,178 141,178 86,786 141,178 141,178 
   
Intercept -0.372*** -0.617*** -0.601*** -0.365*** -0.605*** -0.603*** 
 (-4.91) (-5.66) (-5.62) (-4.83) (-5.61) (-5.65) 
FLIST 0.016 0.023 -0.068** 0.021 -0.023 -0.125** 
 (0.23) (0.40) (-2.54) (0.35) (-0.91) (-4.07) 
FLIST×D(HfQ) 0.557*** 0.273*** 0.146*** 0.621*** 0.365*** 0.249*** 
 (4.81) (3.39) (2.81) (5.16) (5.16) (4.57) 
Sales Growth 0.524*** 0.423*** 0.424*** 0.525*** 0.423*** 0.424*** 
 (20.78) (23.06) (23.07) (20.79) (23.05) (23.07) 
Log (Sales) -0.083*** -0.056*** -0.055*** -0.083*** -0.056*** -0.055*** 
 (-13.14) (-12.75) (-12.36) (-13.19) (-12.74) (-12.31) 
Industry Q 1.706*** 1.531*** 1.542*** 1.702*** 1.529*** 1.542*** 
 (35.44) (32.52) (32.91) (35.28) (32.55) (32.93) 
Country effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.161 0.136 0.136 0.161 0.136 0.136 
 
This table reports the regression test results of valuation changes around foreign listings for firms with different 
valuation prior to the listing. D(HfQ) is a dummy that equals one if the Q ratio of the foreign listed firm prior to the 
listing exceeds the annual median across all firms from the same country. The first three columns show the results 
when firm pre-listing valuation is recorded two years prior to the listing, Firm Q (-2). The last three columns – when 
the pre-listing valuation is computed as the median firm Q before the listing, Firm Q (pre-listing median). The 
estimation results are shown three data splits: U.S. firms listed abroad, foreign firms listed in the U.S., and foreign 
firms listed outside the U.S. (N/US). The dependent variable is firm’s Tobin’s Q. Firm’s Q and all other variables are 
defines as in Table 4. The table also shows the adjusted R-squares and, in parentheses, the t-statistics. Standard errors 
are clustered by the firm. The year and country (when necessary) fixed effects are included in each regression but the 
coefficients are not shown. Notations *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 11 
Foreign listing premium for U.S. firms 
 
 
 Whole sample period 1985-1995 1996-2006 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Observations 86,114 86,114 86,114 37,488 48,626 
  
Intercept -0.428*** -0.429*** -0.447*** -0.308*** -0.518*** 
 (-9.45) (-9.46) (-10.23) (-5.16) (-7.30) 
FLIST -0.046     
 (-0.38)     
FLIST×  D(LY = 1985-1990)  -0.036    
  (-0.40)    
FLIST×  D(LY = 1991-1995)  -0.226    
  (-0.94)    
FLIST×  D(LY = 1996-2000)  0.171    
  (1.20)    
FLIST×  D(LY = 2001-2006)  -0.132    
  (-0.77)    
FLIST× D(Host = Japan)   0.125 -0.030 0.281** 
   (1.11) (-0.31) (2.07) 
FLIST× D(Host = Canada)   0.075 -0.122 0.097 
   (0.53) (-1.59) (0.59) 
FLIST× D(Host = Germany)   0.307** 0.158 0.321* 
   (1.99) (1.24) (1.79) 
FLIST× D(Host = Other)   -0.298 -0.277 -0.322 
   (-1.30) (-0.81) (-1.37) 
Sales Growth 0.189*** 0.200*** 0.199*** 0.324*** 0.117*** 
 (9.57) (9.59) (9.60) (11.16) (4.30) 
Log (Sales) -0.030*** -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.032*** 
 (-9.64) (-9.58) (-9.70) (-9.21) (-5.69) 
Industry Q 0.561*** 0.601*** 0.600*** 0.500*** 0.645*** 
 (15.74) (15.77) (15.95) (9.25) (14.56) 
Firm Q (-2) 0.955*** 0.916*** 0.917*** 0.896*** 0.931*** 
 (36.82) (36.89) (37.58) (28.26) (37.10) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.480 0.480 0.480 0.519 0.481 
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Table 11 (continued) 
 
 
This table reports the regression test results for a panel of U.S. firms across different host markets, time periods, and 
industry and firm characteristics. The dependent variable is firm’s Tobin’s Q. Firm Q (-2) is the firm’s Q two years 
prior to the listing. Firm’s Q and all other variables are defines as in Table 4. The table also shows the R-squares and, 
in parentheses, the t-statistics. Standard errors are clustered by the firm. The year fixed effects are included in each 
regression but the coefficients are not shown. Notations *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 12 
Foreign listing premium for the top ten home markets with firm valuation control    
 
 
 Canada US UK Australia India 
Observations 6,677 86,114 15,481 4,373 2,378 
   
Intercept 0.269* -0.428*** -0.439*** 0.044 0.044 
 (1.82) (-9.45) (-3.24) (0.27) (0.20) 
FLIST 0.183 -0.046 -0.284** 0.218** -0.923*** 
 (1.54) (-0.38) (-2.07) (2.45) (-4.55) 
Sales Growth -0.003 0.199*** 0.124*** -0.042 0.155 
 (-0.11) (9.57) (3.50) (-1.41) (1.15) 
Log (Sales) -0.050*** -0.034*** -0.024*** -0.044*** 0.024 
 (-3.58) (-9.64) (-3.46) (-3.91) (1.39) 
Industry Q 0.305*** 0.601*** 0.611*** 0.152 0.728*** 
 (3.48) (15.74) (7.26) (1.48) (3.65) 
Firm Q (-2) 0.855*** 0.916*** 0.841*** 1.051*** 0.867*** 
 (21.69) (36.82) (17.67) (32.91) (11.48) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.572 0.480 0.432 0.603 0.569 
 
 
 Japan Israel Netherlands France Germany 
Observations 30,639 356 2,309 7,286 8,420 
   
Intercept 0.120 -0.784*** -0.811*** -0.669*** 0.433** 
 (1.56) (-2.88) (-3.38) (-3.70) (-2.36) 
FLIST -0.213*** -0.380** 0.046 -0.114 0.067 
 (-2.97) (-2.12) (-0.70) (-0.98) (0.66) 
Sales Growth 0.463*** -0.104 0.417** 0.274*** 0.221*** 
 (5.20) (-1.49) (2.54) (3.78) (4.11) 
Log (Sales) -0.048*** -0.008 -0.025** -0.018*** -0.040*** 
 (-7.64) (-0.55) (-2.34) (-2.78) (-4.96) 
Industry Q 0.285*** 0.483*** 0.677*** 0.547*** 0.660*** 
 (8.73) (2.74) (3.24) (6.08) (6.63) 
Firm Q (-2) 0.916*** 1.082*** 0.853 1.034 0.930 
 (19.23) (6.78) (15.33) (19.43) (12.77) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.609 0.627 0.535 0.484 0.463 
 
This table reports the valuation premium from foreign listing in the top ten home markets. These markets include 
Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, India, Japan, Israel, the Netherlands, France, and 
Germany. The dependent variable is firm’s Tobin’s Q. The dependent variable is firm’s Tobin’s Q. Firm Q (-2) is the 
firm’s Q two years prior to the listing. Firm’s Q and all other variables are defines as in Table 4. The table also 
shows the adjusted R-squares and, in parentheses, the t-statistics. Standard errors are clustered by the firm. The year 
and country (when necessary) fixed effects are included in each regression but the coefficients are not shown. 
Notations *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 13 
Foreign listing premium for the top ten host markets with firm valuation control 
 
 US UK Luxembourg Germany Japan 
Observations 223,731 223,731 223,731 223,731 223,731 
   
Intercept -0.451*** -0.460*** -0.461*** -0.456*** -0.457*** 
 (-9.74) (-10.26) (-10.23) (-10.16) (-10.14) 
FLIST -0.163** -0.168** -0.547*** 0.080 0.056 
 (-2.04) (-2.53) (-4.68) (1.48) (0.82) 
Sales Growth 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 
 (13.63) (13.64) (13.65) (13.64) (13.64) 
Log (Sales) -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.033*** 
 (-13.67) (-13.71) (-13.48) (-13.95) (-13.73) 
Industry Q 0.501*** 0.500*** 0.500*** 0.500*** 0.501*** 
 (21.98) (21.89) (21.91) (21.90) (21.88) 
Firm Q (-2) 0.943*** 0.943*** 0.943*** 0.943*** 0.943*** 
 (62.74) (62.55) (62.51) (62.49) (62.49) 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.508 0.508 0.508 0.508 0.508 
 
 
 France New Zealand Canada Switzerland Netherlands 
Observations 223,731 223,731 223,731 223,731 223,731 
   
Intercept -0.458*** -0.458*** -0.458*** -0.458*** -0.462*** 
 (-10.19) (-10.16) (-10.16) (-10.16) (-10.29) 
FLIST -0.023 0.121* 0.126 -0.020 -0.425 
 (-0.23) (1.95) (1.07) (-0.11) (-1.61) 
Sales Growth 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 
 (13.64) (13.64) (13.64) (13.64) (13.64) 
Log (Sales) -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.032*** 
 (-13.81) (-13.72) (-13.69) (-13.74) (-13.69) 
Industry Q 0.500*** 0.500*** 0.500*** 0.500*** 0.500*** 
 (21.86) (21.89) (21.89) (21.92) (21.89) 
Firm Q (-2) 0.943*** 0.943*** 0.943*** 0.943*** 0.943*** 
 (62.49) (62.49) (62.49) (62.65) (62.49) 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.508 0.508 0.508 0.508 0.508 
 
This table reports the valuation premium from foreign listing in the top eight host markets. These markets include the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Germany, Japan, France, New Zealand, Canada, Switzerland, and 
the Netherlands. The dependent variable is firm’s Tobin’s Q. The dependent variable is firm’s Tobin’s Q. Firm Q (-
2) is the firm’s Q two years prior to the listing. Firm’s Q and all other variables are defines as in Table 4. The table 
also shows the adjusted R-squares and, in parentheses, the t-statistics. Standard errors are clustered by the firm. The 
year and country (when necessary) fixed effects are included in each regression but the coefficients are not shown. 
Notations *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 14 
Impact of home and host market valuations on valuation of U.S. and non-U.S. firms listed abroad 
   
 High Home Q High Host Q  
 US firms US listings N/US listings US firms US listings N/US listings
Observations 86,114 137,529 137,529 86,114 137,529 137,529 
   
Intercept -0.428*** -0.365*** -0.345*** -0.428*** -0.366*** -0.346*** 
 (-9.43) (-4.54) (-4.13) (-9.45) (-4.55) (-4.12) 
FLIST -0.230* -0.262*** -0.173 -0.072 -0.190*** 0.040 
 (-1.86) (-3.98) (-1.81) (-0.93) (-4.75) (0.46) 
FLIST×D(HmQ) 0.199* 0.293*** 0.031 0.037 0.140*** -0.230** 
 (1.94) (4.88) (0.23) (0.34) (2.80) (-2.26) 
Sales Growth 0.199*** 0.139*** 0.139*** 0.199*** 0.139*** 0.139*** 
 (9.57) (10.81) (10.75) (9.58) (10.78) (10.75) 
Log (Sales) -0.034*** -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.034*** -0.029*** -0.031*** 
 (-9.64) (-10.96) (-10.62) (-9.64) (-10.88) (-10.61) 
Industry Q 0.601*** 0.615*** 0.616*** 0.602*** 0.613*** 0.616*** 
 (15.74) (16.31) (16.39) (15.76) (16.32) (16.39) 
Firm Q(-2) 0.916*** 0.950*** 0.950*** 0.916*** 0.950*** 0.950*** 
 (36.86) (59.42) (60.02) (36.83) (59.15) (59.98) 
Country effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.480 0.530 0.530 0.480 0.530 0.530 
 
This table reports the regression test results of valuation changes around foreign listings for the sub-samples of 
listings that are placed in highly valued home (first three columns) and host markets (last three columns). A home 
(host) country is highly valued, denoted through a dummy variable D(HmQ), if its aggregate Tobin’s Q exceeds the 
median home (host) market Q in a given year. The estimation results are shown three data splits: U.S. firms listed 
abroad, foreign firms listed in the U.S., and foreign firms listed outside the U.S. (N/US). The dependent variable is 
firm’s Tobin’s Q. Firm’s Q and all other variables are defines as in Table 4. The table also shows the adjusted R-
squares and, in parentheses, the t-statistics. Standard errors are clustered by the firm. The year and country (when 
necessary) fixed effects are included in each regression but the coefficients are not shown. Notations *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1. Changes in firm valuation around the listing for the top ten home markets. The figure presents the 
Tobin’s Q valuation premium for firms from the top ten home markets. Diamond thick curve denotes listing 
premium without firm valuation control. Circled thin curve denotes listing premium with firm valuation control. The 
plot covers the period from five or more years bore the listing to five or more years after the listing. Year -5 denotes 
a period prior to five years before the listing, while year 5 denotes five or more years after the listing. 
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Figure 2. Changes in firm valuation around the listing for the top ten host markets. The figure presents the 
Tobin’s Q valuation premium for firms from the top ten host markets. Diamond thick curve denotes listing premium 
without firm valuation control. Circled thin curve denotes listing premium with firm valuation control. The plot 
covers the period from five or more years bore the listing to five or more years after the listing. Year -5 denotes a 
period prior to five years before the listing, while year 5 denotes five or more years after the listing. 
